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Transitioning from Transaction-Based 
Markets to Alliance-Based Supply Chains: 
Implications for Firms
by Thomas L. Sporleder, Constance Cullman Jackson, and Dennis Bolling
Rapid technological innovation, such as biotechnology
and information technology, is part of food industry
dynamics and complicates individual firm strategy. As
these technologies become more important, managers of
firms in the global food system wrestle with defining their
optimal strategies. Also, judging supply chain performance
from a public policy perspective becomes more arduous.
Managers must decide over time on their firm’s research
and development (R&D) initiatives, the firm’s core com-
petencies and boundaries, and the firm’s relationships to
upstream suppliers and downstream customers. How can
we better understand these dynamics and the implications
for participants within those supply chains?
Rapid advances in biotechnology generate the oppor-
tunity for genetically engineered customized production of
plant and animal products that possess distinct traits tar-
geted to specialized end-use markets. Pharming is a good
example of this.1 Promising scientific processes provide the
foundation for an increasing stock of intellectual property
in the form of genetically engineered plant and animal
material that is patented, trademarked, protected as trade
secrets, or otherwise insulated from imitation. Genetic
engineering enhances the stock of intellectual property
(IP). IP, in turn, invites and empowers food and agribusi-
ness firms to create strategies to differentiate their prod-
ucts. In general IP, flowing from product or process inno-
vation, provides a foundation for a novel basis for rivalry
relative to a firm’s competitors (Bontis, 2002). Managers
continually pursue strategies which they believe may result
in sustainable competitive advantage for their firm relative
to rivals (Porter, 1985).
Like biotechnology, rapid advances in information
technology are inviting enhanced supply chain coordina-
tion. For example, online B2B (business-to-business) mar-
ketplaces connect consumer-goods manufacturers, suppli-
ers, and retailers in networks for the purpose of
minimizing costs. GlobalNetXchange recently announced
a merger with rival WorldWide Retail Exchange in an
effort to facilitate all member firms of the merged
exchange to better control supply chain inventory and
reduce supply chain cost (Chicago Sun-Times, 2005).
The longer-term foundation of rivalry in the global
food system is shifting. Encouraged by the rapid develop-
ment of IP, the foundation of rivalry within the global
food system is shifting away from tangible assets toward
intangible assets (Boehlje, 1999). The consequences of this
evolution are pervasive and fundamentally change the
character of relationships among firms within the global
food system. In particular, when the basis for rivalry is cen-
tered on intangible assets, value-creating vertical networks
are spawned in response (Sporleder & Moss, 2002). 
This article discusses the consequences of the changes
that are evolving in food supply chains. The basic notion is
that the basis for rivalry is shifting in the interdependent
1. The two major markets that dominate biotechnology 
applications are human health and food. Recent trends in 
biotechnology suggest that the traditional lines between 
food and medicine will blur. The future medicine cabinet 
may contain compounds harvested from bioengineered 
pharmaceutical plants. These plants have been altered by 
recombinant DNA technology (genetic engineering) to 
contain genes capable of ‘manufacturing’ a biologic or 
drug compound. These compounds are then harvested and 
make their way into applications in human medicine or 
veterinary health applications. Hence, ‘pharming’ is the 
use of genetically engineered plants or livestock to produce 
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“farm gate to plate” food industries.
The discussion focuses on vertical
network coordination or alliance-
based supply chains as one special-
ized response to this new basis for
rivalry. How these responses result in
transitioning away from transaction-
based markets is discussed, particu-
larly for commodity markets. Value
capture has enhanced the need for
supply chain participants to cor-
rectly identify the target market
space.2 The authors argue that food
supply chains have unique character-
istics based on the nature of vertical
dependencies found within chains.
Vertical Network Alliances 
Strategic alliances are intermediate
between open spot markets and com-
plete vertical integration (Sporleder,
1992). Vertical alliances coagulate
among upstream and downstream
firms in an effort to form networks
that are synergistic and add value
beyond what an individual firm may
be able to achieve (Lazzarini, Chad-
dad, & Cook, 2001). The networks
are formed to create competitive
advantage by investing in and con-
trolling relation specific assets,
knowledge sharing routines, comple-
mentary resources and/or capabili-
ties, and effective governance within
the vertical network (Dyer & Singh,
1998; Sporleder, 1994; Sporleder &
Peterson, 2003; Teece, 2000).
A more sophisticated understand-
ing of how exchange relationships
develop revolves around intellectual
property that induces firms to structure
exchange relations vertically within the
food chain i n  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  m a x i -
mizes transaction value. In essence,
vertical network alliances form (often
based on IP) around an objective of
maximizing value added within the
vertical supply chain.
For example, Suiza Foods,
through their Morningstar Foods
division, formed a strategic alliance
with Hershey to create supply chain
value. Hershey is responsible for con-
tributing enhanced flavor technolo-
gies while Morningstar is responsible
for contributing enhanced packaging
technologies (Wall Street Journal,
2000). Sparling and Cook (1998)
analyze an international strategic alli-
ance involving Casa Ley with Sun
World International. This strategic
alliance, based on IP leveraging, was
aimed at enhanced shelf-life vine-ripe
tomatoes and other fresh products.
The foundation adopted here for
the transition to alliance-based sup-
ply chains is that firms in vertical net-
works can increase value creation by
increasing d e p e n d e n c e  o n  a  s m a l l
number of suppliers (limiting suppli-
ers to one or a few) and thereby deep-
ening incentives of suppliers to share
knowledge and engage in R&D.
Firms in alliance-based supply chains
may make performance-enhancing
investments of benefit to their down-
stream customers and the overall sup-
ply chain (Sporleder & Peterson,
2003). 
Supply Chains and Vertical 
Networks
Networks are defined as a mode of
organization that is used by managers
or entrepreneurs to position their
firm at a competitive advantage over
rival firms. This arrangement is
viewed as a long-term, purposeful
arrangement that allows each firm to
operate as a distinct firm, yet partici-
pate in a vertically-allied network. A
formal definition of an alliance-based
supply chain is useful. Such a supply
chain consists of firms that participate
in a vertically-linked organizational
network and share a strategic vision
centered on the objective of creating
value within the network. Member
firms remain independent, but trust
one another and may more readily
share proprietary information. Of
course, a network may be only a por-
tion of a supply chain.
Alliance-based supply chains
imply the ability to differentiate
products and to quickly respond to
market changes compared to tradi-
tional transaction-based supply
chains. Alliance-based supply chains
can identify targeted markets and cre-
ate value for products and services.
This is a huge leap from the typical
focus in transaction-based supply
chains to creating  value. Value cre-
ation is accomplished by forming
alliances that leverage intellectual
property to match unique product
characteristics and information tech-
nology with under-served markets. 
Supply Chains as a Basis for 
Rivalry 
One of the challenges that occur for
managers and entrepreneurs within
the global food system is to adjust
managerial perceptions concerning
the identification of rivals. Percep-
tions may change with or without
technology adoption.
Retail grocery stores in the
United States illustrate the evolution
in the perception of rivals over time.
The now outdated managerial per-
ception was that retail grocery stores
competed against similar stores in the
same industry. The perception of
rivalry has now evolved to include
not only the traditional competitors
but also quick service food establish-
ments, such as McDonalds and
Burger King. This expanded percep-
2. Value capture often is defined as the 
managerial strategy to enhance 
value of the firm’s product or service 
and/or reduce costs without sacrific-
ing quality.4th Quarter 2005 • 20(4) CHOICES 277
tion of rivals is multi-industry in
scope. This evolution in rivalry has
resulted in retail grocery store man-
agers perceiving their market to
include selling meals, not solely the
traditional role of selling ingredients
for meals. One obvious consequence
of this evolution has become more
delicatessens and ready-to-eat prod-
ucts offered in grocery stores.  
As supply chains transition from
transaction-based to alliance-based, it
becomes even more difficult to assess
one’s rival. A rival’s tangible assets are
relatively easy to identify and assess.
As rival firms’ holdings become
increasingly concentrated in intangi-
ble assets, the capabilities and capaci-
ties of rivals become more uncertain
and even ascertaining the industries
that may produce future rivals
becomes more elusive. For example,
traditional food processors such as
Kellogg did not anticipate consumer
preference shifts to on-the-go break-
fast foods, and new rivals developed
from firms in industries outside the
mainstream ready-to-eat breakfast
cereal manufacturers. 
The transition from transaction-
based supply chains to alliance-based
supply chains changes many “drivers”
or factors that managers must con-
sider. The traditional basis of rivalry,
compared to a new and evolving basis
for rivalry, is outlined in Table 1. An
important aspect of the new basis for
rivalry is the existence of an alliance-
based supply chain centered on soft
assets (e.g., IP) rather than hard assets
(e.g., plant and equipment). A major
purpose of the alliance-based net-
work becomes the commercializa-
tion of the technology, typically
focused on target markets that are
relatively low volume and/or repre-
sent specialized end-use.3 Trust
becomes more pronounced within
alliance-based supply chains (Sporle-
der, 1994). For example, trust is espe-
cially critical in the early stages of a
cooperative interfirm alliance.
The generic items summarized in
Table 1 offer some indication of the
challenges to, and the evolution of,
managerial perceptions presented
within alliance-based supply chains.
The first six items of the table are
associated with internal management
of the firm. The next four items are
factors associated with the competitive
environment in which the firm oper-
ates. The last two items of the table
are factors associated with strategic
planning and outcomes. Not all items
may pertain to a specific situation. 
Recent improvements in our abil-
ity to transmit information have
forged new partnership and alliance
opportunities among firms around
the globe. Now an agribusiness firm
may form an alliance of a block of
growers in the United States, a phar-
maceutical firm in Europe, and a
manufacturer in India to produce a
highly specialized product based on
biotechnology intellectual property.
The use of genetically engineered
plants to harvest medicinal com-
pounds, such as corn to produce
monoclonal antibodies, is just emerg-
ing. In this example, it is no longer
clear whether a firm’s rivals are grow-
ers, a research company or a proces-
sor or even within the agribusiness
sector. Complicating the issue is that
the firm, via its alliances, is now
international with multinational
assets.
As the public strives to assess the
performance of these new alliances,
non-traditional measurement tech-
niques are required. Assessing the
performance of IP-driven relation-
ships is more difficult, compared to
physical asset-driven relationships,
because of the tacit knowledge
involved.4  Tacit knowledge (knowl-
edge that people carry in their minds
that is, therefore, difficult to access
and difficult to codify) often is a fac-
tor in understanding the value prop-
osition of relationships and the value
of knowledge firms possess within
the chain (Sporleder & Moss, 2002).
Some new performance measure-
ments will surely rely on improved
definition, valuation, and under-
standing of intangibles (Lev, 2001).
Market Space Defined by 
Dependency and Differentiation
Considering commodities and food
products in a market space defined
by the degree of differentiation and
the nature of dependency within sup-
ply chains adds to our understanding
of why various exchange arrange-
ments are frequent in some supply
chains, but not in others. The extent
of differentiation, of course, typically
increases in markets closer to the
final consumer level. 
Another factor inherent to agri-
cultural commodities and food prod-
ucts, in a comparative sense, is per-
ishability. Perishability partially
determines the inherent nature of
economic dependency within supply
chains. For less-perishable commodi-
ties, storage can be a primary means
of vertical coordination in the supply
chain. Buffer stocks are held by firms
in upstream and downstream mar-
kets in an effort to mitigate risk and
generally deal with unexpected
3. Additional consequences of the shift 
from commodities to differentiated 
products and some market structure 
issues are addressed by Rausser, 
Scotchmer, and Simon (1999).
4. See Tirole (1988) for a standard 
treatment of the role of market 
forces and industry structure on the 
performance within markets and 
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events. Vertically dependent firms at
successive stages in the supply chain
are referred to as sequentially depen-
dent because buffer stocks play a
major role in risk mitigation and
coordination. The portions of a sup-
ply chain that rely on buffer stocks
for risk mitigation typically also rely
on transaction-based open markets. 
In commodity markets character-
ized by perishable commodities,
reciprocal dependency is the relation-
ship among vertically allied firms in
the marketing channel. Buffer stocks
are not feasible. One consequence of
this is that the coordination problem
is more severe and alternative
exchange mechanisms emerge
beyond simple spot market transac-
tions, such as contracting, joint ven-
tures, and various forms of strategic
partnering. In short, these alterna-
tive exchange mechanisms are exam-
ples of interfirm alliances. These
alternatives are attempts to enhance
coordination and, in part, “substi-
tute” for the economic role that
buffer stocks play in the sequentially
dependent channels. The relative
relationship among some selected
commodities and food products can
be easily portrayed in the market
space defined by the intersection of
differentiation intensity and sequen-
tial-reciprocal dependency (Figure 1).
Along the vertical axis, the fungi-
bility of items decreases from the bot-
tom of the axis to the top. Thus,
items such as soybean oil are more
fungible than pharmaceutical corn.
In general, the space above the hori-
zontal requires relatively increased
investment, often predominantly in
intangibles. Moving from left to right
of the vertical represents declining
potential for buffer stocks and the
increasing reliance on exchange
arrangements that tend to replace
cash markets, such as contracting and
strategic alliances.
The “dependency/differentiation”
space may be used to understand the
Table 1. Economic drivers for managers of firms in the transition from transaction-based to alliance-based supply chains.
Driver Traditional Basis of Rivalry New Basis of Rivalry
Firm Assets Tangible (hard) Intangible (soft)
Firm Mission Manufacture/assemble Create/add value; focus on “trait” demand
Tactics Build/acquire key manufacturing facilities Quickly out-source and partner with other firms; share 
proprietary information
Key Objective Achieve scale economies Create value, excel in low-volume target niche markets, 
customize products
Human Resources Reward individuals Utilize empowered teams 
Quality/safety Fix quality problems as they occur Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP); adopt identity 
preservation and traceback technologies
Product/service Aspects of Rivalry Based on cost Based on traits and product differentiation; vertical traceability 
or “identity preservation” is an important component of the 
vertical network
Perception of Rivals Other firms in the same industry Other vertical networks competing in the same market space
Farm Gate Agricultural producer sells undifferentiated 
commodity which is commingled with other 
production at the first handler level, identity of 
producer or production protocols not preserved 
downstream
Agricultural producer harvests biotechnologically-modified and 
patented “value added” items provided under contract to first 
handler
Number and Turnover of Suppliers Several competitive suppliers, turnover expected; 
price sensitive relationships
Limit suppliers to a few, turnover not expected or at least more 
stable; relationship relatively less sensitive to price
Strategic Planning Secret strategic planning, no vertical sharing of 
proprietary information
Share strategies within a network; adopt vertical system goals; 
off-load some R&D to upstream suppliers where possible
Managerial Success Criterion Maximize shareholder value Maximize shareholder value partially through maximizing 
supply chain value creation
Table 2. Selected exchange 
mechanisms that are typical within the 
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major thrusts within value creating
alliance-based supply chains (Table
2). The distinction of sequential and
reciprocal dependency and the extent
of product differentiation are factors
useful for better understanding the
type of exchange mechanism that is
appropriate for a particular combina-
tion of dependency and differentia-
tion. The relative importance of
alternative exchange mechanisms is
provided within the cells of Table 2.
The dynamics of how firms partici-
pate in supply chains that drift from
transaction-based to alliance-based
may generally be characterized as
m o v e m e nt  a wa y  fr o m  e i t he r  c e ll  o f
the ‘reciprocal’ row of Table 2 to
either of the cells of the ‘sequential’
row.
Conclusions 
The basis of rivalry within the global
food system is shifting over time
toward alliance-based supply chains
where intangibles serve as a founda-
tion for spawning closer coordination
i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  c r e a t e  v a l u e .  F i r m s
may participate in an alliance-based
supply chain network for the purpose
of creating competitive advantage
through investing in and controlling
relation specific assets, knowledge
sharing routines, complementary
resources, and/or capabilities. The
key element is that intellectual prop-
erty induces firms to structure exchange
relations vertically within the food
chain i n  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  m a x i m i z e s
transaction value. In essence, transac-
tion-based supply chains develop
around an objective of maximizing
value creation within the chain.
The basis for rivalry is shifting
and these shifts present challenges for
managerial perceptions. Factors asso-
ciated with internal management of
the firm, the competitive environ-
ment in which the firm operates, and
strategic planning and outcomes all
must be revised when firms join an
alliance-based supply chain.  Firms
may adopt new definitions of their
rivals and look beyond traditional
sectors to identify collaborators and
competitors, while new means of
assessing firm performance may
become necessary.
The degree of differentiation and
the nature of dependency within sup-
ply chains enhances our understand-
ing of the incentives for alliance for-
mation. The transition to alliance-
based supply chains creates chal-
lenges in how firms assess their rela-
tive position within industry and
requires novel approaches to under-
standing both competitors and col-
laborators. Participation in alliance-
based supply chains demands mana-
gerial flexibility and nimbleness, yet
offers virtually unlimited opportuni-
Figure 1. Selected examples of items in the dependency and differentiation space.280 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2005 • 20(4)
ties to leverage assets. Firm assets
concentrated in intangibles, in tan-
dem with novel alliance formation,
offers exciting potential for value cre-
ation within the global food system.
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